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Abstract
We analyze the decision to participate and performance at the Modern Olympic Summer Games at the
country level. We use an unbalanced panel of 118 countries over all 24 editions of the Summer Games
since 1896. The main focus of the paper is on economic, geographic and demographic determinants of
Olympic participation and success. We estimate the impact of income per capita, population size, home
advantage, and some fixed country factors on participation and success rates. We present separate results
for events before and after the Second World War. These results indicate that income is an important
determinant of Olympic participation and success. Socialist countries send more athletes to the games and
have more success in medal counts. The home advantage has become less prominent.
(also downloadable) in electronic version: http://som.rug.nl/
1 We thank Mr Anthony T. Bijkerk, Secretary-General of the Olympic Society of Olympic Historians, for
his kind provision of participation data.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In ancient times in the valley of Olympia in southwestern Greece the Olympic Games were held
every four years. From 776 B.C. it took more than 1100 years until Emporer Theodosius of Rome
considered them to be pagan and decided to forbid the games in 393 A.D. Baron Pierre de
Coubertin proposed a revival of the games in 1892. He succeeded in his initiative and since 1896
the modern Olympics games have been organized. Despite wars and boycots the games survived
political struggles and are currently considered to be the top sports event around the globe.
At the very first editions of the Summer Games competition was not fierce in most of the events.
Participating was more important than winning. Especially the richer countries (sometimes
represented by wealthy athletes) participated and collected medals. Gradually winning became
more important and competition increased. In 1936 the Olympic Games were even politicized by
Nazi Germany. Not the individual performance but the national performance was in the focal
point of attention. After the Second World War the Olympic Games were even subordinated to
the Cold War policies. But the most important change of the games is the globalization of
participation and competition through improvement of economic conditions around the world. In
this paper we analyze this economic development of the Olympic Summer Games.
The ultimate goal of our analysis is the construction of a model that forecasts future distributions
of Olympic medals across nations. In that respect we analyze medal counts as a proxy of national
performance. Does a country get a “fair” share of the medals? How can we define a fair share? Is
there a home advantage? Is the home advantage decreasing because of the increase of
competition? What’s the impact of different population growth figures across the world? Are
political regimes relevant? Is emancipation important? How can we proxy for the effect of a
societal positive attitude for sports? To that extent we analyze all the 24 versions of the modern
Summer Olympic Games since 1896. We include 118 countries that were able to win a medal at
least once at the games. We do not include the Winter Games, since these games have serious
bias in the selection of competing countries. We also do not include countries that never won a
medal. This creates a selectivity bias. So we are not able to analyze the issue of participating at
the games or not, but we can analyze the problem of how many athletes a country should send to
the games.
What is the relevance of a study like this? There are several things to be learned in our opinion.
First, a lot of countries seem to consider the decision to organize a future edition of the games.
Implicitly they assume that the net benefits of organizing the Olympic Games are bigger than the
costs. The costs are mostly huge, and the benefits are not all that clear. In most cost-benefit
analyses decision-makers include a net present value of future increases of economic activity
through consumer optimism. The increase in consumer optimism is mostly related with success atthe games. Being the host country an estimate of future medal potential is helpful. Secondly,
many National Olympic Committees predict their medal tallies before the games. Their
methodology is mostly based on summing the probabilities of winning medals in individual
events. Based on those estimates and the final results of the games, decisions on government
financing sports are based. We base our predictions on the aggregated national data and argue that
we reduce the forecast error by considering a portfolio of events. We can estimate the “normal”
medal returns, indicating outperformance of an individual NOC.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the literature on
modeling national Olympic performance. In section 3 we introduce the data. In section 4 we
present the models and the estimation results. We conclude with a summary and conclusions.
2 Olympic performance literature
There are two strands of literature on the analysis of Olympic performance at the national level.
First there is an extensive literature on the analysis of medal tallies of individual events. Who did
actually win the Olympic Games if we correct for variable A and variable B? Popular variables to
deflate medal totals with are population size and national income. For each event the winner of
the newly weighed results can be computed. The second strand of the literature is more
interesting and tries to model Olympic performance based on multiple events. We review this
type of literature more extensively.
For the post-World War II games sociologists and economist analyzed the impact of social and
economic conditions on the results. Examples of these studies are Ball (1972), Grimes et al.
(1974) and Levine (1974). Strange enough this literature did not develop further until the 1990’s.
An explanation of this might be that in the 1970’s and 1980’s the Olympic Games were troubled
by the Cold War. As known the USA did not participate at the Moscow 1980 Games, while the
USSR did not show up at the Los Angeles 1984 Games. The first study that restarts the
performance analysis is Slughart et al (1993), who analyze the problem for transitional
economies. Recently two studies, by Johnson and Ali (2000) and Bernard and Busse (2000),
relived the attention for this issue. Our paper is in line with those two studies. We give special
attention to the approach taken by Johnson and Ali (2000) and Bernard and Busse (2000).
In general the literature shows that population size, income per capita, the home advantage, and a
socialist/communist tradition have a major impact on the medal counts. Population size is the
fundamental determinant of medal success. A larger population increases the group of potential
athletes. There is a debate on the impact of a larger population on performance though. A country
like India has a large population but a relatively low success rate at the Games. So is Bangladesh,
the country with the largest population that never won a medal. Another issue in this respect isthat countries with large groups of talented athletes are not allowed to send them all. For most
events there are participation limits. So the relation between population and Olympic success is a
complicated one.
The second determinant found is income per capita. A higher income allows a country to
specialize in sports, to train athletes better, to provide better medical care, to send a larger group
of athletes to the games, etc. In the Olympic history the richer countries have participated at many
more events than developing countries. As we will show later on, income per capita was a crucial
determinant at the first editions of the Games. There is evidence that the costs of transport and
medical care, etcetera decreased over time, which enables even poor countries to send delegates.
The third determinant is the home advantage. It helps to send more athletes and to get more
support during the games. The home country is allowed to participate in all events. Moreover, the
crowd of home spectators will support the performing home athletes. Attention in the media puts
further pressure on the home athletes. It seems that at the recent versions of the Games countries
that will host the next version of the games perform better. Korea doubled its medal share at the
1984 games and hosted the Olympics in 1988. Australia performed significantly better at the
Atlanta Games in 1996. And Greece doubled its medal normal share at the Sydney 2000 Games.
This is a time-to-build argument: it takes long run planning to create a group of optimal
performing athletes.
The fourth determinant is the political system. There is large evidence that communist countries
perform better. Economies with central planning allowed more specialization in sports. More
national resources were used for training and supporting athletes than in market-based economies.
Moreover sports were considered to be an instrument the increase the national standing. Finally,
there is the suspicion that socialist athletes used more drugs than others. There is no serious proof
though. Wallechinsky (2000) reports the results of positive drug tests from 1968 up to and
including the 1996 Games. Of the 48 positive drug tests at the Summer Games, only 15 cases
involve athletes from communist countries.
Since the breakdown of the East-European communist systems things changed a little. In the last
decade economic development allowed also market-based economies to specialize further in
sports. The other issue is that professional sports are more integrated with the Games since 1988.
But the former socialist countries are able to perform at a very high standard despite the
liberalization process. Examples are Russia, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria.
A fifth determinant is the national sports culture. Is sport really a societal activity? If so, a country
is probably better able to use resources for training, etc. If performance is accepted andappreciated by the public, athletes will be stimulated more. This variable is hard to measure
though and has not been used by previous studies.
How is Olympic performance modeled? Johnson and Ali (2000) present two types of models.
First they estimate an equation for the number of participants per country. They assume
participation to be a quadratic function of GDP per capita, population, the home advantage, a
dummy variable indicating immediate geographical proximity to the hosting nation, a dummy
variable indicating the political system, and variables indicating former colonial links. Johnson
and Ali present results for total participation and female participation. They conclude on a data
set that includes 138 countries and 1095 country-event observations since 1952 that a home
country almost doubles its participation and a neighbor country sends about 25% more athletes. A
monarchy sends fewer athletes to the Games, and rather surprisingly, communist countries do not
send more competitors. Next Johnson and Ali estimate performance. First the estimate the
probability of individual success using a similar specification as the model that explains
participation. Based on more than 60 thousand observations they find that the home advantage
adds twelve percent change of success. On the national level (using again a model in absolute
medals and quadratic in GDP per capita and population, etc) the home advantage is estimated to
be an additional 25 medals, of which 12 are gold medals. Communist countries outperform the
others by 12 medals (5 gold medals).
Bernard and Busse (2000) estimate probit models for medal shares (note that Johnson and Ali use
absolute medal counts) using data for the events since 1960. First they use population shares. If a
country had been able to double its population it would increase its medal share by 1.5%
percentage point. Next they specify a Cobb-Douglas production function for medal shares, using
population share and GDP-capita as production factors. Moreover they include a dummy variable
for the home advantage, a soviet-dummy and a non-Soviet but planned economy dummy. The
home advantage is estimated to be 1.2 percentage point medal share. The soviet dummy varies
between 3 and 6 percentage points. Bernard and Busse also estimate time-to-build effects. These
are found to be significant.
3D a t a
We include data for all modern Olympic Summer games since 1896. This implies that we include
all 24 events in our sample. On the one hand this increases the number of observations compared
to Johnson and Ali (2000) and Bernard and Busse (2000). On the other hand this leads to more
problems in data collection (see below). Including the older versions of the games might also bias
the true current parameters. Therefore we use split-samples to analyze differences through time.
We collected the medal data from Wallechinsky (2000) with the Yahoo Sports reports on theSydney 200 Games. We included the 118 countries that won at least one medal at one of the 24
events (we consider Bohemia to be the Czech Republic). A full listing of the countries included is
given in the Appendix.
Table 1 gives an overview of the modern Olympic Summer Games. The Table includes
information on the number of athletes, female participation, number of countries represented at
the games and the number of events held. The Table shows that in the first ten editions of the
games before the Second World War 289 country-event observations are present.
Data on participation by country are given by Kluge (1981) for the Olympic Games up to and
including the Moscow 1980 games. For later editions of the Games we used data from Statistical
Annexes of the Official Report of the Games (kindly provided by the International Society of
Olympic Historians). We do not analyze female participation and success separately.
Next we collected data on GDP. GDP data are typically hard to find for some countries,
especially for those not included in the sets of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank. In
our sample this typically holds for Cuba, Monaco, and the Peoples Republic of Korea. The other
problem is the provision of consistent estimates of GDP before the Second World War. We used
Maddison (1995) for dollar weighed uniform priced GDP. Maddison gives estimates for about 15
countries in our sample back to 1870. This group of countries includes a majority of the countries
that participated in the first ten editions of the Summer Games. Of the 289 country-event
observations of the first ten editions of the games we are able to cover 209 using these GDP data.
Maddison moreover provides estimates for Cuba for short time intervals of the 20th century.
Data on population are provided by Maddison (1995) and by the World Bank. The World Bank
provides moreover a data set on development indicators (see Easterly, 2000). We use this set for
other geographical and demographic data, such as longitude and latitude, female labor
participation (in 1980), legal system dummies etc.
4 Model and estimation results
We estimate two models, as suggested by Johnson and Ali. First we estimate participation. Next
we model Olympic performance in terms of medal shares for gold, silver and bronze, conditional
on participation. We estimate the model in a combined time-series cross-section form. First we
use the events as cross-section, after that we use the countries as units to account for time-to-build
effects. Throughout this section we estimate the models with the fixed-effects estimator.
Alternative estimators would be the random coefficients model or instrumented panel estimators.The first estimator allows for stochastic differences between cross-section units. Experimenting
with this estimator led to inferior results for our models though. The second estimator could be
used to correct for endogeneity of the regressors. For instance if one includes a lagged dependent
variable. We will use an IV-estimator in the model that explains the success rates. In those
models we estimate the shares of e.g. gold medals on the endogenous participation rate. In our
dynamic models we don’t correct for endogeneity, because our observation matrix is rather
sparse.
4.1 Participation
The dependent variable is PSHit, which represents the fraction in percentages of athletes at game t
(t=1,..,24) from country i (i=1,..,118) from the total number of participating athletes. Modeling in
shares avoids problems of nonstationarity. Let Pit be the absolute potential number of athletes
delegated by country i. Suppose now that each world citizen has an equal probability to become a
top athlete. In that case Pit will be dependent on the size of the total population of a country at the
time of the t
th e d i t i o no ft h eS u m m e rG a m e sPOPit. There are several valid arguments why
Olympic participation is not proportional to the absolute size of the population. Suppose we have
a stochastic series X1,…, Xn which is identical independently standard normal distributed N(0,1).
The expected value of the supremum Xsup of all possible outcomes is of order √ log(n) (see Reiss,
1989). So it is likely that the maximum performing individual of a population of size POPit will
be of the order √ log(POPit). Since this result also holds at the world level, PSHit will be
determined by the square root of the log of population share (POPSHit).
Next we assume that income per capita (YSHit, in shares of total world income) will determine the
training and health conditions of the potential athletes. We measure income by the 1990 Geary
Khamis dollar denominated GDP per capita figures as presented by Maddison (1995). We
average to Olympic GDP per capita series by taking the arithmetic averages over the last 4 years.
We restrict the participation share to be positive (the upper bound of 100 per cent is not binding
in any case) by taking the natural logarithm of the participation share:
log PSHit =a√ log(POPSHit)+b log(YSHit)+Ci (1)
where Ci represents a country specific determinant. We expect both parameters to be positive.
The potential share of athletes PSHit is disturbed by two effects. First we have the home
advantage HOMEit (=1 if country i hosts Games t, = 0 in other cases). Home countries are
allowed to send more athletes. Secondly, we have the distance DISTit to the Games. We measure
the distance by taking the square root of the cubic terms that denote the differences in coordinates
of latitude and longitude between the hosting and the visiting country. Note that we correct for
taking the shortest route. This leads to the following specification:log PSHit =a√ log(POPSHit)+b log(YSHit) +c *H O M E it+d *D I S T it +C i +e it (2)
where eit is a white noise residual. Finally, we can model the country specific effects Ci.I n
previous studies, the socialist origin of countries has been found to be relevant to Olympic
participation and success. Another determinant is emancipation, which we measure by female
labor participation. Especially for the more recent editions of the Games the number of women
events increases.
We present the results of this model in Table 2. Table 2 contains the estimation results of this
model for the whole sample, the pre-WWII and the post-WWII editions. Table 2 shows that all
the determinants are important contributors in the explanation of participation in the Olympic
Games. The population share contributes importantly to participation shares, although its impact
is decreasing. The same holds for the impact of the share in income per capita. If country i
increases its income share by 1 percentage point, participation is increased by about 0.8
percentage points. The home advantage is substantial, especially before WWII. Note that the two
pre-WWII US editions of the Games contributed to a large extent to this result. The countries
with high female labor participation tend to send more athletes to the Games. After WWII the
socialist countries are found to send about 1 percentage-point more athletes.
Table 3 presents the results for the same model, but with countries as cross-section units. Through
that we skip the fixed factors, female labor participation and the dummy variable for socialist
countries. The parameter estimates are in the same order of magnitude. From this angle the
income share elasticity seems to be lower though. More interesting is Table 4, where we present
the results for the time-to build effect. After WWII it seems relevant to include the lagged
participation information. The partial adjustment coefficient is about 0.2. Note that we don’t treat
lagged participation as an endogenous variable for reasons set out above. The quality of the
model using a lag is better though, so we proceed to include lagged participation in the model
version.
Table 5 gives the results for the same specification of the model, but now including TV-sets per
capita as an additional variable. Although this variable is correlated with GDP per capita it might
explain a little more of the variance of participation via media attention. Media attention is
increasingly important. We are able to analyze the impact of the media for the games from Rome
up to and including Barcelona. This is the main argument to present the results separately from
the previous ones. The model including TV-sets typically has less observations. Again we
estimate the model two ways: with the editions and the countries as cross-section units. From the
first regression (with events as cross-section units) indeed it seems that countries with a largenumber of TV-sets per capita send more athletes to the Summer Games. The country-specific
results seem to object to this argument, since we find no evidence of TV-sets.
Summing up, using information over more than a century we find that national Olympic
participation depends on:
•  The share of world income per capita;
•  The growth of relative population;
•  The home advantage;
•  The distance to the hosting country;
•  The legal status of the country, more specifically whether a country has a socialist
background;
•  The degree of female labor participation;
•  Historical participation (time-to-build an Olympic team).
If we compare the pre- and post-World War II periods we observe that the home-advantage
decreased and the distance to the games has a lower elasticity in the recent editions. The impact
of income and population is important in the event-specific model, but typically less relevant in
country-specific regressions. Finally, there is some evidence that media attention might be
relevant in explaining a higher participation rate in recent editions of the Summer Games.
4.2 Success
In the previous subsection we modeled national Olympic participation as a function of income per
capita, population, distance to the games and some country specific factors. Now we turn to
Olympic success in terms of winning medals. We model the national shares in medal totals MSH.
We distinguish the medals by type: gold, silver, and bronze. Our main innovation is that we
model medal shares as a function of participation shares. Since participation is endogenous we
use the estimated participation results from the previous section. As we illustrate below, the data
clearly reveal that national medal success is dependent on participation. The notion that
participating is more important than winning is proven to be untrue: participation is nowadays the
crucial determinant of Olympic success. Of course this is due to selection and qualification
regulation. In modeling Olympic success we therefore concentrate on determinants of success
given participation.
We model the share of medals (gold, silver, and bronze) as a function of the participation share,
the home advantage, the legal systems and again income per capita. The home advantage relates
to the home crowd that supports the home team. The legal system relates to the fact that some
countries might be more restrictive and selective to sending athletes, leading to a higher average
quality of the team. In the country-specific regressions we include GDP per capita again as an
additional determinant to indicate a higher average quality of a national team.We have again two types of regressions: event-specific fixed effects, where we can include
variables indicating differences between countries, and country-specific effects, where we focus
on the dynamics of medal winning. Analyzing the data both ways so reveals the importance of
cross-sectional variation and time dynamics. Table 5 starts with the basic event-specific
regressions. The model includes the home advantage, participation, legal systems and two
dummy-variables for the USA and USSR. Since we include all the events in these regressions we
need to correct for the fact that due to boycotts the USA and USSR probably won more medals
than normal. In 1980 for instance the USA did not participate in the Moscow Games, leading to a
very high percentage of medal winning by the USSR. The opposite effect holds for the 1984 Los
Angeles Games, where the USSR was absent and the USA won more medals than they would
normally do.
Table 6 presents the results for event-specific regressions for both the whole sample and the post-
WWII period (with a fixed effect for each edition of the Games). Panel A highlights that a one-
percentage point increase in participation leads almost to an increase in medal success by 0.35 to
0.40 for all medal types. The home advantage helps in earning more medals. The impact on
winning gold medals is the strongest. Legal origin matters in winning medals. Socialist countries
not only sent more athletes to the Games, but also won more medals. Scandinavian countries also
have a strong reputation in winning medals. On the other hand countries with a French legal
origin typically have less success at the Summer Games. All Latin-American countries for
instance are relatively unsuccessful in winning medals. Panel B includes the event-specific model
for the events after World War II. Here we can observe that the participation effect is about as
important as it is in the model that includes all editions of the Games. The home advantage is
typically less after WWII, and for winning bronze medals it is even insignificant. Socialist
countries keep their advantage in winning medals, since their participation starts after the Second
World War. Scandinavian countries still win more gold medals. The USA and USSR-impact is
strong as we can see from the significance of the dummy-variables.
Table 7 presents the results for the model with country-specific fixed effects for both the whole
sample and the post-WWII period. From Panel A we again observe that the home advantage is
the strongest in winning gold medals. Again we find that estimated participation helps in
explaining medal success. The long-run participation elasticities are about 0.5 to 0.6. Income is
found to be a relevant variable in this model. The partial adjustment coefficients are the largest in
winning gold medals. This illustrates that there is some hysteresis in winning gold medals. From
Panel B we can observe that the home advantage has decreased in the more modern editions of
the Games. Moreover, the impact of GDP per capita is typically less significant.Table 8 finally describes the transition or persistence from one quality of medal to the other. We
use the post-WWII sample and estimate e.g. gold medal performance on past gold-, silver-, and
bronze medal winning success. If a country was successful at the last edition of the Games it is
more likely to win a medal (no matter what kind) this time. Here we observe that winning gold
medals is typically a determinant of winning medals at the next edition of the Games. The
persistence in winning silver or bronze medals is much lower. The implied long-run own
elasticities of the gold, silver, and bronze persistence are about 1.5, 1.2, and 1.3 respectively. The
cross long-run elasticities of gold to silver and bronze are about twice bigger than viceversa (0.4
to 0.5 versus 0.2 to 0.3 respectively). Winning gold medals therefore has important spin-offs for
future Olympic success.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes Olympic participation and success at all the modern editions of the Summer
Games. Using a large data set including Olympic statistics and income per capita and
demographic information we are able to explain participation shares and medal success at the
country level. First we model participation, after that we show that conditional on participation
we can model success in the medal standings.
The following can be concluded. First, the economic condition of a country still is important for
both participation and to a lesser extent for success. The impact of income per capita has
diminsihed though. The same holds for the impact of population size and distance to the Games.
The home effect is important, especially for participation. Here we have a regulated effect, the
home team is allowed to send more athletes. This effect is still strong, but used to be more
important at the older editions of the games. Probably transport costs caused a bias to home
representation. The home advantage in success is less clear. Before World War II the home
advantage was strong via participation and success. At the recent games the home advantage has
shown to be relevant in e.g winning gold medals. The legal tradition of a country, as a proxy of
the sports culture is relevant for modeling participation and success. Especially socialist countries
send more athletes and earn more medals. French legal system countries perform less impressive.
Emancipation is found to be important. Media attention is important is explaining participation.
Winning gold medals, finally, has important consequences for future Olympic success.References
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ZimbabweTable 1 – Modern Olympic Summer Games
Year City Athletes Female Countries Events
1896 Athens 245 0 14 43
1 9 0 0 P a r i s 1 1 1 8 2 12 87 5
1904 St Louis 627 6 12 84
1908 London 2023 44 22 109
1912 Stockholm 2490 55 28 102
1 9 2 0 A n t w e r p 2 6 6 8 7 72 91 5 4
1924 Paris 3070 125 44 126
1928 Amsterdam 3014 290 46 109
1932 Los Angeles 1328 127 37 116
1936 Berlin 3956 328 49 129
1948 London 4064 355 59 136
1952 Helsinki 4879 518 69 149
1956 Melbourne 3258 384 72 151
1960 Rome 5348 610 83 150
1964 Tokyo 5081 683 93 163
1968 Mexico City 5423 768 112 172
1972 Munich 7173 1058 121 195
1976 Montreal 6024 1246 92 198
1980 Moscow 5217 1124 80 203
1984 Los Angeles 6797 1567 140 221
1988 Seoul 8439 2197 159 237
1992 Barcelona 9365 2707 169 257
1996 Atlanta 10310 3513 197 271
2000 Sydney 10650 4069 199 300
Source: Up to and including 1984: D. Wallechinsky (2000), The Complete Book of the Summer
Olympics, Sydney 2000 Edition, The Overlook Press, After 1984: Statistical Annexes of the
Official Report of the Olympic Games.Table 2 – Participation at the Games - Fixed effects for events
Dependent variable is the log of the percentage participation share log(PSH);
Home = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
Female labor = the percentage of female workers in the labor force in 1980;
YSH is the share of GDP per capita of a country as a percentage of the total GDP/capita of the 118
sample countries;
POPSH is the country population share of the population of all 118 countries;
Distance = distance in kilometers from the capital of the host country to the capital of the
participating country;
Socialist = 1 if a country has a socialist legal system;
R
2 is the adjusted determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
.
All Games Pre-WWII Post-WWII
1896-2000 1896-1936 1948-2000
log(Home+1) 1.417 1.599 1.016
(0.282) (0.513) (0.260)
log(Female labor) 1.342 2.347 1.212
(0.103) (0.509) (0.104)
log(YSH) 0.766 0.889 0.753
(0.027) (0.141) (0.027)
√ log(100*POPSH) 1.703 1.850 1.700
(0.073) (0.222) (0.075)
log(Distance/1000+1) -3.892 -9.975 -2.399
(0.565) (1.461) (0.563)
log(Socialist+1) 0.973 -0.892 1.271
(0.115) (0.359) (0.115)
R
2 0.648 0.532 0.678
SSR 732 177 496
# countries 98 37 98
# country-events 1111 206 905Table 3 – Participation at the Games - Fixed effects for countries
Dependent variable is the log of the percentage participation share log(PSH);
Home = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
YSH is the share of GDP per capita of a country as a percentage of the total GDP/capita of the 118
sample countries;
POPSH is the country population share of the population of all 118 countries;
Distance = distance in kilometers from the capital of the host country to the capital of the
participating country;
R
2 is the adjusted determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
.
All Games Pre-WWII Post-WWII
1896-2000 1896-1936 1948-2000
log(Home+1) 1.363 1.522 0.721
(0.226) (0.367) (0.154)
log(YSH) -0.176 -0.970 0.084
(0.072) (0.608) (0.075)
√ log(100*POPSH) 0.617 -0.879 1.020
(0.361) (1.404) (0.412)
log(Distance/1000+1) -2.592 -7.301 -2.153
(0.349) (1.695) (0.319)
R
2 0.745 0.540 0.806
SSR 536 158 296
# countries 108 37 108
# country-events 1190 206 981Table 4 – Time-to-build in participation at the games
Dependent variable is the log of the percentage participation share log(PSH);
Home = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
YSH is the share of GDP per capita of a country as a percentage of the total GDP/capita of the 118
sample countries;
POPSH is the country population share of the population of all 118 countries;
Distance = distance in kilometers from the capital of the host country to the capital of the
participating country;
R
2 is the adjusted determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
.
All Games Pre-WWII Post-WWII
1896-2000 1896-1936 1948-2000
log(PSH(-1)) 0.271 0.111 0.252
(0.042) (0.081) (0.047)
log(Home+1) 1.182 1.503 0.709
(0.223) (0.437) (0.153)
log(YSH) 0.044 -0.572 0.182
(0.069) (0.606) (0.075)
√ log(100*POPSH) 0.116 -5.549 0.084
(0.357) (4.052) (0.376)
log(Distance/1000+1) -2.804 -8.096 -2.238
(0.341) (1.530) (0.307)
R
2 0.796 0.612 0.834
SSR 343 88 207
# countries 108 36 108
# country-events 1019 163 856Table 5– Participation at the games – TV-sets
Dependent variable is the log of the percentage participation share log(PSH);
Home = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
Female labor = the percentage of female workers in the labor force in 1980;
YSH is the share of GDP per capita of a country as a percentage of the total GDP/capita of the 118
sample countries;
POPSH is the country population share of the population of all 118 countries;
Distance = distance in kilometers from the capital of the host country to the capital of the
participating country;
Socialist = 1 if a country has a socialist legal system;
TV-sets = number of TV-sets per capita;
R
2 is the adjusted determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;






















# countries 81 87
# country-events 580 530Table 6 – Medal counts with event-specific intercepts
Dependent variable: log of the percentage medal share log(MSH+1);
Home = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
Socialist = 1 if the country is ruled under the socialist legal system;
Scandinavian = 1 if the country is ruled under the Scandinavian Civil Law system;
French =1 if the country is ruled under the French legal system;
German = 1 if the country is ruled under the German legal system;
USA = dummy-variable representing the USA;
USSR = dummy-variable representing the Soviet Union;
PSH
e= estimated participation share of athletes (results of Table 2, first and last column);
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel A: All Games – 1896-2000
Gold Silver Bronze
log(Home+1) 0.991 0.842 0.671
(0.248) (0.227) (0.224)
log(Socialist+1) 0.358 0.372 0.316
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
log(Scandinavian+1) 0.327 0.317 0.352
(0.111) (0.107) (0.114)
log(French+1) -0.043 -0.084 -0.095
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
log(German+1) 0.124 0.282 0.255
(0.114) (0.111) (0.112)
log(USA+1) 2.512 1.978 1.676
(0.148) (0.141) (0.166)
log(USSR+1) 2.240 1.752 1.482
(0.159) (0.134) (0.167)
log(PSH
e) 0.352 0.385 0.391
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
R
2 0.604 0.608 0.580
SSR 300 282 297
# countries 98 98 98
# country-events 1111 1111 1111P a n e lB :P o s t -W o r l dW a rI IG a m e s :1 9 4 8 - 2 0 0 0
Gold Silver Bronze
log(Home+1) 0.735 0.540 0.393
(0.258) (0.170) (0.225)
log(Socialist+1) 0.502 0.482 0.404
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
log(Scandinavian+1) 0.266 0.087 0.072
(0.100) (0.101) (0.113)
log(French+1) -0.031 -0.094 -0.101
(0.044) (0.046) (0.046)
log(German+1) 0.196 0.360 0.277
(0.124) (0.118) (0.121)
log(USA+1) 2.661 2.043 1.626
(0.164) (0.142) (0.167)
log(USSR+1) 2.194 1.716 1.392
(0.141) (0.117) (0.145)
log(PSH
e) 0.329 0.361 0.384
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
R
2 0.624 0.635 0.602
SSR 183 171 185
# countries 98 98 98
# country-events 905 905 905Table 7 – Medal counts with country-specific intercepts
Dependent variable is the log of the percentage medal share log(MSH+1);
Home = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
YSH is the share of GDP per capita of a country as a percentage of the total GDP/capita of the 118
sample countries;
PSH
e= estimated participation share of athletes sent by a country (results of Table 4);
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel A: All Games – 1896-2000
Gold Silver Bronze
log(Home+1) 0.867 0.795 0.513
(0.146) (0.147) (0.154)
log(MSH(-1)+1) 0.408 0.345 0.292
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031)
log(YSH) 0.131 0.079 0.123
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
log(PSH
e) 0.205 0.216 0.284
(0.051) (0.053) (0.054)
R
2 0.806 0.795 0.769
SSR 118 120 132
# countries 108 108 108
# country-events 1091 1019 1019
The countries not included in this model are: Netherlands Antilles, Bahama’s, Barbados, Iceland,
Virgin Islands, Monaco, North Korea, Quatar, Suriname and Tonga.Panel B: Post-World War II Games – 1948-2000
Gold Silver Bronze
log(Home+1) 0.643 0.491 0.380
(0.144) (0.143) (0.153)
log(MSH(-1)+1) 0.384 0.247 0.268
(0.031) (0.033) (0.035)
log(YSH) 0.076 0.051 0.073
(0.038) (0.038) (0.041)
log(PSH
e) 0.167 0.188 0.208
(0.059) (0.059) (0.063)
R
2 0.826 0.822 0.795
SSR 69 68 78
# countries 108 108 108
# country-events 856 856 856Table 8 – Medal persistence with country-specific intercepts
Dependent variable is the log of the percentage medal share log(MSH+1);
Home = 1 if a country hosts the Olympic Games, else 0;
YSH is the share of GDP per capita of a country as a percentage of the total GDP/capita of the 118
sample countries;
Goldsh = share of gold medals;
Silversh = share of silver medals;
Bronzesh = share of bronze medals;
PSH
e= estimated participation share of athletes sent by a country (results of Table 4);
R
2 is the determination coefficient and SSR is the sum of squared residuals;
The White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
Gold Silver Bronze
log(Home+1) 0.687 0.542 0.455
(0.142) (0.138) (0.145)
log(Goldsh(-1)+1) 0.267 0.192 0.248
(0.037) (0.036) (0.038)
log(Silversh(-1)+1) 0.118 0.073 0.151
(0.039) (0.038) (0.040)
log(Bronzesh(-1)+1) 0.140 0.153 0.080
(0.037) (0.036) (0.038)
log(YSH) 0.077 0.038 0.068
(0.038) (0.036) (0.038)
log(PSH
e) 0.102 0.115 0.111
(0.059) (0.057) (0.061)
R
2 0.832 0.836 0.816
SSR 66 62 69
# countries 108 108 108
# country-events 856 856 856